Russia is on the move. Over 100,000 Russian troops, supported by armour and electronic warfare systems, have amassed on the borders of Eastern Ukraine. With the distraction of the ongoing Coronavirus pandemic, and increasing inter-European and American partisanship, the environment seems ripe for new Russian territorial advances. Yet, one would never get an admission of such ambitions from Russian premier Vladimir Putin. The official Russian line, as repeated by state propaganda, has been that the deployment of its Ground Forces is a strictly defensive measure; a reaction to supposed NATO aggression.

Russia has “nowhere further to retreat to” according to Putin. Russia wants NATO to return to its pre-1997 borders, reasserting a buffer zone between Western Europe and Russia’s heartland in its west. The Russian leader has demanded that NATO withdraw its 2008 pledge to admit Ukraine and Georgia as a condition for de-escalation. This pledge has not been consummated, yet its threat looms as a persistent reminder of the tightening encirclement of the modern Russian state.

The strategy of a Russian invasion would seem to be a pincer movement, potentially cutting Ukraine in half through the Dnieper river. Troops and tanks are performing military exercises in northern ally Belarus, their presence enabling a total encirclement of Ukrainian troops stationed on the Russian border. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 further enables such a strategy by providing a launchpad from the south. Moreover, there remains the nightmarish scenario of paratroopers in Kyiv, and a Russian blitzkrieg in the East.

The end goal of Russian aggression is uncertain: the spectrum ranges from total annexation; to the reassertion of a Soviet-style puppet government; to partial annexation of the Black Sea coastline. The ambiguity of Putin’s strategy is in itself part of the strategy, and the fear of modern war in Europe has assured an acute severity to the situation. In recent days, the West has accused the Kremlin of lining up a provisional puppet government, formed of former Ukrainian MPs who hold sympathies to Russia. Whether this is the plan, or a distraction, remains to be seen.

The logic of the renewed Russian threat cannot be detached from Russia’s monopoly on the supply of European natural gas. Ukraine continues to contest the massive natural gas reserves in the Black Sea, most of which Russia now claims due to the disputed extension of its Economic Exclusive Zone enabled through its annexation of Crimea. Russia has already wound down its routing of gas through Ukraine, depriving it of a significant source of revenue. The goal of a Russian invasion vis. natural gas would be to secure its current position, and expand its supply further. If true, this would imply a likely total annexation of the Southern border, connecting Russia to its European ally Moldova.

It would be wise to dismiss any claim of Russian ambition to reclaim its old Soviet borders, Putin’s calculations are determined by modern issues, not those of a bygone era.

The Nord Stream 2 pipeline entirely bypasses Ukraine, and it remains uncertain whether Europe can deny its development as an economic sanction, given its current energy crisis, and the likelihood that this problem will recur each winter. Maintaining their monopoly position on European natural gas is essential to Russia, it is their lifeline from extreme economic sanctions and an important source of revenue paid in foreign currency.

Why now?

The Kremlin has vanquished the internal threat of Alexei Navalany. It’s only political threat in the short term is its Western rivals. Putin must secure the economy of Russia from threats of Western sanctions, and natural gas is the key to this. The Russian economy, continuing a historical trend, remains weak and overly reliant on natural resources. The amendment of this problem requires a long term strategy, in the meantime, its short-term geopolitical position is its priority.

The West is distracted by its ongoing problems with Covid, an issue more easily treated - or neglected - in an autocratic state like Russia. Furthermore, the primary guarantor of Eastern European security - the US - remains internally divided after its 2020 election. There is little appetite for a foreign war when much of the populace sees their neighbour as the primary enemy.

A new age may be dawning in Europe. If Russia is to make a move, it will be before the spring rains prevent tank advancements. The imminence of European war may not be generating universal alarm at the current moment, but as the clock ticks, this threat to the established order deepens.

by Harry Fuller

Russia's Gambit: Why a Move on Ukraine Seems Imminent